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Abstract
In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific
inquiry aimed at investigating how different social networks impact the
efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. As such, the ABM is a
computational tool for tackling issues in the domain of scientific method-
ology and science policy. In contrast to existing ABMs of science, our
model aims to represent the argumentative dynamics that underlies sci-
entific practice. To this end we employ abstract argumentation theory as
the core design feature of the model. This helps to avoid a number of
problematic idealizations which are present in other ABMs of science and
which impede their relevance for actual scientific practice.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a computational tool for tackling issues in the domain
of scientific methodology and science policy, which concern social aspects of
scientific inquiry and the division of cognitive labor. Recent approaches to these
questions have utilized agent-based models (ABMs) (e.g. [27, 28], [26], [4], [24],
etc). One of the advantages of such formal approaches is that they avoid hasty
generalizations resulting from the traditional case-study approach since they
employ an experimental method in which a number of relevant variables can be
controlled during the run of simulations. However, the main pitfall of ABMs is
that they frequently suffer from a high degree of idealization and simplification,
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which may sometimes impede the relevance of the results for the context of
actual scientific inquiry [16, 24].
One such idealization concerns the question how we represent evaluations
on the basis of which scientists choose paths to pursue. Ever since Laudan
introduced the notion of the context of pursuit [13], many have argued that the
assessment of one’s research direction has to be distinguished from the epistemic
justification of one’s beliefs (e.g. [15, 21]). While in some ABMs these two
types of evaluations have been conflated (e.g. [27, 28]), in others the former
type of assessment has been represented in an oversimplified way (e.g. [26]). In
both cases the way in which scientists respond to the information which they
receive from their peers, and in view of which they update their pursuit-related
attitudes, has not been modeled according to the idea of heuristic appraisal [15].
This idea assumes that when scientists face possible anomalies in their research
programs, such anomalies trigger a search for counterarguments that could turn
apparent refutations into confirmatory instances [12].
This points to another problematic idealization frequently present in ABMs,
namely the fact that the interaction among scientists is represented as a sim-
ple update in view of received information. While some models have tried to
relax this idealization by representing agents as “trusting” others only if they
have sufficiently similar views (e.g. [10]), by introducing “noise” in the received
information [4], by assigning different weights to the opinions of agents [18], or
by assigning different epistemic systems to agents [3], these adjustments do not
capture the argumentative nature of scientific interaction, such as the above
mentioned search for a counterargument in face of an attack.
In this paper we offer a novel approach to the agent-based modeling of sci-
entific inquiry, which is based on argumentation, and which aims to soften the
above mentioned idealizations. In contrast to most other ABMs of science, our
model is based on the idea that an essential component of scientific inquiry is
an argumentative dynamics between scientists. To this end, we employ abstract
argumentation frameworks as one of the design features of our ABM (previously
shown fruitful for the modeling of scientific debates in [22] and employed in an
ABM of social behavior in [7]).
The presented version of the model is designed to investigate how differ-
ent social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in discovering the best
of the pursued scientific theories. This question has previously been tackled
in [27, 28] whose ABMs suggest that information sharing may sometimes be
counter-productive for the efficiency in knowledge acquisition. This is due to
the fact that scientists may initially get misleading results, suggesting that the-
ory T1 is better than theory T2, while from an objective point of view it is the
other way around. If such misleading information is shared widely, the whole
scientific community may start pursuing T1 and abandon T2. However, recent
discussion in [19] has shown that the results by Zollman [27, 28] regarding the
harmful effects of increased interaction are not robust under some minor changes
of the relevant parameters. Nevertheless, the authors also point out that similar
results have been obtained by a structurally different model, namely the one by
Grim [8], which leaves the question of the epistemic benefits of scientific inter-
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action open. Moreover, both Zollman’s and Grim’s models have been criticized
as suffering from various problematic idealizations in [20], which impede the
relevance of their results for actual scientific practice. One of these simplifica-
tions is the above mentioned representation of scientific interaction as a simple
update in view of new evidence. The aim of our model is to tackle the same
question, while representing scientific interaction in a more adequate way.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the idea un-
derlying our ABM and its main features. In Section 3 we present the central
findings of the presented version of our model. In Section 4 we compare our
findings with those obtained by other ABMs of science and discuss idealizations
present in our current model, which should be taken into consideration when
assessing the relevance of our results for the actual scientific practice. In Section
5 we suggest ideas for further enhancements of this ABM.
2 The model
The aim of our ABM is to represent scientists engaged in a scientific inquiry
with the goal of finding the best of the given rivaling theories, where they
occasionally exchange arguments with other scientists. In this section we will
explain the central elements of our model, namely, the landscape which agents
explore, the behavior of agents and the notion of social networks employed in
our simulations.1
2.1 The landscape
Agents, representing scientists, move along an argumentative landscape. The
argumentative landscape, which represents rivaling theories in a given scientific
domain, is based on a dynamic abstract argumentation framework. Let us
explain what ‘abstract’ and ‘dynamic’ mean here.
An abstract argumentation framework (AF), introduced by Dung in [5] is a
formal framework consisting of a set of abstract entities A representing argu-
ments and an attack relation  over A. Similarly, the framework underlying
our model consists of a set of arguments and an attack relation over this set. In
addition to attacking each other, arguments may also be connected by a discov-
ery relation ↪→. The latter represents the path which scientists have to take in
order to discover different parts of the given theory, i.e., some argument b in the
given theory can only be discovered after an argument a has been discovered
for which a ↪→ b.
A scientific theory is represented as a conflict-free set of arguments (i.e. no
argument in the theory attacks an argument in the same theory), connected by
discovery relations, resulting in a tree-like graph. Formally, an argumentative
landscape is given by a triple 〈A, , ↪→〉 where A = 〈A1, . . . ,Am〉 is partitioned
1The source code is available at
https://github.com/g4v4g4i/ArgABM/tree/AppArg2017-submission.
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in m many theories Ti = 〈Ai, ai, ↪→〉 which are trees with ai ∈ Ai as a root and
 ⊆
⋃
1≤i,j≤m
i 6=j
(Ai ×Aj) and ↪→ ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤m
(Ai ×Ai).
Specifying  like this ensures that the theories are conflict-free.
The abstractness of the framework concerns all of its elements. Instead
of providing the concrete content and structure of the given arguments, we
represent them as abstract entities. Similarly, we do not reveal the concrete
nature of the attack or the discovery relation.
The framework is dynamic in the sense that agents gradually discover ar-
guments, as well as attack and discovery relations between them. Given the
abstract nature of arguments, we interpret them as hypotheses which scien-
tists investigate, occasionally encountering defeating evidence, represented by
attacks from other arguments, and then attempting to find defending argu-
ments for the attacked hypothesis a (i.e., to find arguments in the same theory
attacking arguments from other theories that attack a). This dynamic aspect
is implemented by associating arguments with their degree of exploration for an
agent at a given time point of a run of the simulation: for each agent ag and each
argument a ∈ A, expl(a, ag) ∈ {0, . . . , 6} where 0 indicates that the argument is
unknown to ag and 6 indicates that the argument is fully explored and cannot
be further explored.2 In view of this agents have subjective and limited insights
into the structure of the landscape. Whether an attack or discovery relation
between two arguments a and a′ is visible to an agent ag depends on the degree
of exploration expl(a, ag): the higher expl(a, ag) is, the more relation[s] between
a and other arguments will be visible (additionally agents may learn about the
landscape by communicating with other agents, see Section 2.3).
2.2 Basic behavior of agents
The model is round-based and each round agents perform actions which are
among the following:
1. exploring a single argument, thereby gradually discovering possible attacks
(on it, and from it to an argument that belongs to another theory) as well
as discovery relations to neighboring arguments;
2. moving to a neighboring argument along the discovery relation within the
same theory;
3. moving to an argument of a rivaling theory.
While agents start the run of the simulation at the root of a given theory,
they will gradually discover more and more of the argumentative landscape.
This way each turn an agent operates on her own (subjective) fragment of the
2Our model is round-based (more on that in Section 2.2). Each round may be interpreted
as one research day. Since each of the 6 levels of an argument is explored in 5 rounds, each
argument represents a hypothesis that needs 30 research days to be fully investigated.
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landscape, which consists of her discovered arguments which are explored by her
to a specific degree, and her discovered (attack and discovery) relations between
the arguments.
In order to decide whether to work on the current theory (items 1 and 2
above), or whether to better start working on an alternative theory (item 3)
agents are equipped with the ability to evaluate theories. Every few rounds
agents apply an evaluative procedure, which is based on the degree of defen-
sibility of each of the given theories. A theory has degree of defensibility n if
it has n defended arguments where an argument a is defended in the theory if
each attacker b from another theory is itself attacked by some argument c in
the current theory. Agents decide to move to a rivaling theory if the degree of
defensibility of their current theory is below a relative threshold compared to
the theory with the highest degree of defensibility, i.e., the theory with the most
defended arguments.
To make a decision between options 1 and 2, each agent employs the fol-
lowing heuristic: at every time step she considers all arguments in her direct
neighborhood (relative to the discovery relation) that could possibly be the next
ones to work on. With a certain probability she will then move to one of these
arguments, or alternatively keep on exploring her current argument. In case
the argument she’s currently at is fully explored, she will try to move on to a
next neighboring argument, and if such an argument isn’t visible (e.g., if she
has reached the end of a branch of her theory) she will try to move to the par-
ent argument, or in case it is fully explored, she will move to another not fully
explored argument in the same theory.
The decision making of agents also includes some prospective considerations.
If during her exploration an agent discovers an attack on the argument a she is
currently investigating, she will attempt to discover a defense for it. A defending
argument may be found among the visible neighboring arguments of a (relative
to the discovery relation). In case a is attacked by arguments b1, . . . , bn, an agent
ag working on a will ‘see’ outgoing attack arrows a′  bi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
from an already discovered child argument a′ of a, even in cases where a′  bi is
not yet discovered by ag since a′ is insufficiently explored by ag.3 This way our
agent knows that exploring a′ may help in defending a. If no potential defender
of a is visible she keeps on exploring a in the hope of discovering new neighbors
and thus new potential defenders.
This idea corresponds to the situation in which a scientist discovers a prob-
lem in her hypothesis and attempts to find a way to resolve it. While she may
not have a solution ready at hand, she may have a method for finding such a
solution (for example, going back to the laboratory and conducting some new
experiments).4
3In such cases, where an attack relation is merely ‘seen’ but not yet discovered by an agent,
it is not yet considered as a defense when the respective theory is evaluated by the agent.
4Such a heuristic response to apparent refutations belongs to what Lakatos has dubbed
the negative heuristics of a research program [12].
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2.3 Social networks
An agent discovers the argumentative landscape by investigating arguments
(as described in Section 2.2) or by means of exchanging information about the
landscape with other agents. We will now discuss the later aspect. As mentioned
above, the presented version of the model is designed to investigate how different
social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in discovering the best theory.
In contrast to other ABMs employing the idea of social networks (e.g. [27, 28,
8]), which represent connectivity only in view of different types of graphs that
connect agents, we distinguish between two types of social networks.
First, our agents are divided into collaborative networks that may consist of
individuals working on the same theory (homogeneous groups), or of individuals
working on different theories (heterogeneous groups). While each agent gathers
information (i.e. the attack and discovery relations between arguments) on her
own, every five steps this information is shared with all other agents forming
the same collaborative network.
Second, besides sharing information with agents from the same network, ev-
ery five steps each agent shares information with agents from other collaborative
networks with a given probability of information sharing that is determined be-
fore the run of the simulation.5 This way the agents form ad-hoc and random
networks with agents from other research collaborations. A higher probability
of information sharing leads to a higher degree of interaction among agents.
Finally, we represent reliable and biased scientists by allowing for different
approaches to the sharing of information between networks. A reliable agent
shares all the information she has gathered during her exploration of the cur-
rent theory, while a biased agent does not share the information regarding the
discovered attacks on her current theory.
Agents share information either in a unidirectional (an agent sends informa-
tion to another agent) or a bidirectional way (agents exchange information one
with another). Moreover, our model takes into account the fact that receiving
information is time costly: when an agent receives information, she will not ex-
plore the argument on which she is standing nor move. This corresponds to the
idea that scientists need to invest time when reading papers by other scientists,
which they would otherwise devote to their own research.
3 The main findings
In this section we will first specify the parameters used in the simulations and
then present our main results.
5While agents share their full subjective knowledge within their respective collaborative
networks, the information which they share with agents from other networks concerns recently
obtained knowledge of the theory which they are currently exploring. This corresponds to
a situation in which a scientist writes a paper that presents arguments for and/or against
hypotheses regarding the theory she is currently pursuing.
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3.1 Parameters used in simulations
We have run the simulation 100 times with 10, 20, 30, 40, 70 and 100 agents by
varying the following settings:
1. different probabilities of an agent communicating with agents from other
collaborative networks, namely: 0, 0.3, 0.5, and 1;
2. different types of collaborative networks, namely: homogeneous and het-
erogeneous ones;
3. different approaches to communicating, namely: reliable and biased agents;
4. two different landscapes, one representing two theories, and one represent-
ing three theories.6
The program runs until each agent is on a fully explored theory, since at
this point the agents are locked in the given theories and no further information
is available, in view of which they would move to another theory. Our main
research question is how efficient agents are in each of the above listed scenar-
ios, where efficiency is assessed in terms of the success of agents in acquiring
knowledge, as well as in terms of the time needed for the run to be completed.
In this version of the model we have defined success in the following way: if,
at the end of the run, there is no theory for which the number of agents working
on it is greater than the number of agents working on the objectively best theory,
the run is considered successful. In contrast to some other ABMs of science,
which define success in terms of convergence of all agents onto the best theory
(e.g. in [27, 28]), our notion is obviously weaker. Our choice was motivated by
a pluralist view on scientific inquiry, according to which, a parallel existence
of rivaling scientific theories is epistemically and heuristically beneficial for the
goals of a scientific community (e.g. [14, 11, 2]). A primary epistemic concern
is thus not the convergence of all scientists onto the same theory, but rather
assuring that the best theory is among the most actively investigated ones.
3.2 Preliminary results
In what follows we present the most significant results of our simulations. For
each of the comparisons below we will vary only the parameter given in the
respective paragraph title while keeping all other parameters fixed.
Increased information sharing. Increased information sharing appears
to be beneficial for both reliable and biased groups. On the one hand, homo-
geneous groups that share information with probability 1 perform faster, while
being similarly successful as those with lower strict positive probabilities (SPP)
of information sharing (Fig. 1 and 3). As expected, homogeneous groups that
do not share information among each other perform the worst in terms of both,
6Some other parameters are as follows. Theories are modeled as trees of depth 3, where
each argument (except for the final leaves) has 4 child-arguments. The extent to which each of
the theories is attacked is specified in the interface of the model in terms of the probability that
each of the arguments of the given theory is attacked. Here we have opted for 0.3 probability
since we wish to represent a situation in which rivaling theories are not completely problematic
(as would be e.g. pseudo-scientific theories).
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Figure 1: Success, reliable, homogeneous groups
success and time. On the other hand, heterogeneous groups that share infor-
mation are all similar for SPP in terms of time and success, (see Fig. 2 and 3),
except for larger groups (70 and 100 agents) which are faster in case the prob-
ability of sharing information is 1. Groups with probability 0 perform worse in
both respects.
Reliable vs. biased agents. With respect to homogeneous groups, reliable
agents appear to be more successful than the biased ones in case of SPP of
information sharing, while sometimes being only slightly slower. With respect
to heterogeneous groups, reliable and biased groups perform similarly in terms
of both success and time.
Homogemous vs. heterogenous networks. In case of 0.3 and 0.5 prob-
abilities of information sharing, heterogeneous networks tend to be faster than
the homogeneous ones, while being similar in terms of success. In case the prob-
ability is 1, heterogeneous and homogeneous groups are similar in both respects
(Fig. 3). In case of no information sharing heterogeneous groups are much more
successful. These results hold for both reliable and biased agents.
4 Discussion
In this section we will first compare our results with those obtained by other
ABMs of science, and then we will turn to a critical analysis of some idealizations
present in our model.
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Figure 2: Success, reliable, heterogeneous groups
Figure 3: Time needed
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Our finding that increased communication tends to be epistemically benefi-
cial (or at least, not epistemically harmful) undermines the robustness of con-
clusions drawn from ABMs in [27, 28, 8, 9], under different modeling choices.
As we argue below, there is no reason to assume that any of these ABMs rep-
resent scientific interaction more adequately than the presented ABM does. In
addition, our finding that biased agents perform worse than reliable ones under
conditions of an increased information flow shows that once we apply the no-
tion of bias to the way in which agents share information (rather than to their
confidence in the given theories with which they begin an inquiry, as done in
[28]), we get results that are contrary to [28].
While a number of open issues regarding the comparison of our results with
those obtained by means of other ABMs remain for future research, we can
already highlight the features of our model that allow for a more adequate rep-
resentation of scientific inquiry than this has so far been done with ABMs. First
of all, our model addresses problematic features identified in other ABMs (see
Section 1), namely (i) the inadequate representation of heuristic appraisal, as
well as (ii) the inadequate representation of information flow among scientists.
Regarding (i), scientists in our model are equipped with certain prospective
considerations, explained in Section 2.2. In the current version of the model,
such prospective considerations play a role in methods that guide agents in their
inquiry. It remains a task for a future version of the model to also incorporate
such features into the evaluations performed by agents in view of which they
can judge how promising their theory is. Such an assessment would more aptly
capture heuristic appraisal, which informs scientists how worthy of pursuit dif-
ferent theories are, rather than how confirmed (or defensible) they are in view
of the available evidence.
Regarding (ii), the notion of information flow is in contrast to many other
ABMs of science not just a simple update of information. Instead, exchange of
information is represented as argumentative, which means that received infor-
mation is critically assessed. Hence, when an agent receives new information
regarding a discovered argument, she will assess it as acceptable (in case it can
be defended in view of her knowledge base) or as unacceptable (in case it cannot
be defended in view of her knowledge base).
Moreover, different information triggers different heuristic activities on the
side of the receiver, so that an agent who has discovered an attack on her
current argument tries to find its defense. Finally, we acknowledge the fact that
receiving information (such as reading articles by other scientists) may be time
costly.
Nevertheless, our ABM is still based on a number of idealizations, the impact
of which should be examined in future research. First, heuristics of agents
are highly simplified, including their search for defense in view of discovered
attacks. Even though agents may recognize a defense in case it is located in
their surroundings (i.e. in one of the child-arguments of the given attacked
argument, which an agent currently explores), a defense may be present at an
entirely different branch of the tree. Equipping agents with more insight into
where a defense may be, and thus representing a scientist as having methods
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for finding solutions for the current anomalies of the theory, is another task for
future research.
Second, anomalies of a given theory are currently represented solely as at-
tacks from one of the rivaling theories. An improved version of the model should
allow for anomalies to be represented as counter-evidence discovered only as a
result of exploring the given theory. Future versions of our model will include a
more direct representation of evidence.
Third, what parameter settings for building landscapes in our model are
representative of specific types of scientific controversies is an open question.
In view of these remarks, it is important to interpret the results of our runs
cautiously when it comes to their relevance for the actual scientific practice.
Just like all other existing ABMs of science, our model is still just a “bookshelf
model”, which means that it is still too simplified to be fully informative of actual
scientific practices.7 Nevertheless, as we have argued, the highly modular nature
of our model together with its specific design features makes it significantly closer
to the aim of representing scientific inquiry than the currently existing ABMs.
As such, our model offers a fruitful basis for further improvements, which can
provide insights into real world phenomena.
Finally, let us compare our model with Gabbriellini and Torroni’s (G&T)
ABM [7]. Their aim is to study polarization effects among communicating
agents, for instance, in online debates. Similarly to our approach, their model
is based on an abstract argumentation framework. Agents start with an indi-
vidual partial knowledge of the given framework and enhance their knowledge
by means of communication. Since G&T do not model inquiry, their agents
cannot discover new parts of the graph by means of ‘investigating’ arguments.
Rather, they exchange information by engaging in a dialogue modeled after
Mercier & Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning [6]. This way, agents
may learn about new arguments and attacks but also remove attack relations.
Whether new information is incorporated in the knowledge of an agent depends
on the trust relation between the discussants. The beliefs of agents are repre-
sented by applying Dung-style admissibility-based semantics to the known part
of the argumentation framework of an agent. This is quite different from our
model where the underlying graph topology is given by several discovery trees
of arguments representing scientific theories and attacks between them. This
additional structure of the argumentation graph is essential since we do not
model the agents’ beliefs in individual arguments but rather evaluative stances
of agents that inform their practical decision of which theory to work on. While
an admissibility-based semantics would lead to extensions that feature unprob-
lematic sets of arguments from different theories (ones that form conflict-free
and fully defensible sets), in our approach agents pick theories to work on. For
this, they compare the merits of the given theories, pick the one that is ‘most’
defended (where typically no theory is fully defended before the end of a run),
and employ heuristic behavior to tackle open problems of theories (represented
7The importance of distinguishing between “bookshelf models” and those that are relevant
for real world phenomena has been emphasized in [17] in the context of economic models. The
same considerations apply to models of scientific inquiry.
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by incoming attacks). It will be the topic of future research to include dialogue
protocols that are relevant for scientific communication, such as information-
seeking, inquiry and deliberation dialogues [25].
5 Outlook and conclusion
In this paper we have presented an ABM of scientific inquiry which makes use
of abstract argumentation, aiming to model the argumentative nature of sci-
entific inquiry. The presented version of our model is designed to tackle the
question how different degrees of information flow among scientists affects the
efficiency of their knowledge acquisition. Our results suggest that an increased
information sharing is epistemically beneficial, which undermines the robustness
of contrary results obtained by previous ABMs of science, under different mod-
eling choices. While we have argued that our model represents scientific inquiry
more adequately than the previous ABMs of science, we have also emphasized a
number of issues that remain to be tackled in future research. We will conclude
the paper by showing the fruitfulness of our ABM for the investigation of related
questions concerning social aspects of scientific inquiry.
First, our model can be enhanced with different types of research behavior,
such as “mavericks” and “followers”, introduced in [26]. Next, the model can
be enhanced with other aspects of scientific inquiry, such as an explanatory re-
lation and a set of explananda [22]. This would allow for an investigation of
different evaluative procedures which agents perform when selecting their pre-
ferred theory (e.g. in addition to the degree of defensibility, agents can take into
account how much their current theory explains, or how well it is supported by
evidence). Furthermore, a number of enhancements available from the literature
on AFs, such as probabilistic semantics [23], values [1], etc. can be introduced
in future versions of our ABM.
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